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Investigatory Powers Act 2016 – data retention – compatibility with EU Law – 
order of disapplication 
 
R (on the application of Liberty) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2018] EWHC 975 (Admin)  
 
 
Facts and decision 
 
In this case Liberty (formerly NCCL and a human rights charity) challenged the 
compatibility of Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2106 with both the European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1950. This particular review was concerned only with the challenge under EU 
Law and an order of disapplication of the 2016 Act was sought, an order which to the 
knowledge of the authors has never before been sought, let alone granted, in a UK court 
with respect to EU law obligations. The relevant provisions of the EU Charter were as 
follows: 
 
 Article 7 -  “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and communications”  
 Article 8(1) - ‘‘Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
him or her’’ 
 Article 8(2) -  ‘‘Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on 
the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.  
 Article 8(3) – ‘‘Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority.”  
 Article 11 - ‘’Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’’ 
 Article 11(2)-  ‘‘The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected’’ 
 
Article 51 then provides that the provisions of the Charter are addressed both to the 
institutions of the EU and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union 
law, and that they shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of 
the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties. 
 
Finally, Article 52 provides that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
recognised by the Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those 
rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by 
the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Article 52(3) then 
stresses that in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
that Convention, but that this shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection. 
 
The background to the claim was that the government had previously enacted the Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. This Act was referred to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in the case of Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen 
(C-203/15) EU:C:2016:970), and in Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Watson [2018] EWCA Civ 70 the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Act was 
inconsistent with EU law in two respects: because it allowed access to retained data 
which was not limited to the purpose of combating serious crime, and that access was 
not subject to prior review by a court or independent body. The 2014 Act had by that 
time been repealed, but the 2016 Act substantially re-enacted the 2014 Act, and in July 
2017, in light of Tele2, both defendant secretaries of state conceded that Pt.4 of the Act 
was currently incompatible with EU law in those two respects.  However, the Act has 
remains unrepealed. The claimant submitted that the court should make an order of 
disapplication, suspended for a specified time, to allow the government to amend the 
2016 Act, whereas the secretaries of state submitted that only declaratory relief was 
required. The claimant also submitted that the court should refer several other questions 
arising under the 2016 Act to the Court of Justice. 
 
The relevant provisions of the 2016 Act provides as follows: 
 
 Section 61(7), which sets out the purposes for obtaining communications data, 
where if it is necessary to obtain the data  (a) in the interests of national 
security; (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing 
disorder; (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national 
security; (d) in the interests of public safety … 
 Section 87(1) - “The Secretary of State may, by notice (a “retention notice”) 
and subject as follows, require a telecommunications operator to retain 
relevant communications data if (a) the Secretary of State considers that the 
requirement is necessary and proportionate for one or more of the purposes 
falling within section 61(7), and (b) the decision to give the notice has been 
approved by a Judicial Commissioner.” 
 
 
The High Court (Singh LJ, Holgate J) held that the court had the power – under Rule 
40 the Civil Procedure Rules - to make binding declarations and that there was a 
constitutional convention that the executive would comply despite the lack of coercive 
effect (R. v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.1) [1990] 2 A.C. 
85). The Court also noted that the direct effect of some EU law and the supremacy of 
EU law were incorporated into domestic law via s.2 of the European Communities Act 
1972, and that a binding declaration in the context of EU law was significantly different 
from a non-binding declaration of incompatibility, made under s.4 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, with respect to compatibility of UK law with the rights contained in the 
European Convention.. Thus, although the UK courts could not strike down an Act of 
Parliament, they had a duty to disapply incompatible domestic legislation to the extent 
that it was inconsistency with directly effective EU law.  
 
In the Court’s view, the 1972 Act had a "constitutional character" (R on the application 
of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5), and an 
Act passed after 1972 was subject to that Act's legal effect. The issue in this case was 
the nature and extent of the incompatibility of the 2016 Act with directly effective EU 
law, and the incompatibility consisted of two failures to have safeguards in place. 
Correcting the failures required positive steps in amending legislation and there was no 
obligation immediately to disapply Part 4 of the Act from the moment of the 
acknowledgement of incompatibility. The appropriate approach was to allow the 
government a reasonable time to enact amending legislation. Courts in the UK had to 
proceed with caution: the practical implications of immediate disapplication would be 
enormous and potentially damage the public interest, and constitutional adjudication in 
which primary legislation could be challenged was relatively uncharted territory (R (on 
the application of Chester) v Secretary of State fir Justice [2013] UKSC 63 followed). 
 
Again, in the Court’s view, a provision might be absolutely incompatible with EU law, 
requiring disapplication to the extent of its inconsistency, but this would be the case 
only where the court was not required to set up an alternative scheme. In the instant 
case an alternative scheme of data retention and appeals would be required and 
therefore the court would not immediately disapply Part 4 of the Act. 
The appropriate remedy, therefore, was a declaration, not an order of disapplication. A 
coercive remedy was not necessary, especially in a delicate constitutional context where 
the government proposed to introduce amending legislation. The secretary of state had 
conceded the incompatibility and in the Court’s view it would be reasonable for the 
inconsistency to be remedied by 1 November 2018 (6 months from the date of the 
judgment). 
 
As to the substantive issues, the Court firstly held that no CJEU reference would be 
made as to whether retention for national security purposes fell outside EU law. That 
issue, in the Courts’ view had been squarely raised in an existing reference by the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal and no further reference was required. Further, the issues 
regarding retention of data within the EU and notification of persons abroad when data 
was retained should both be stayed pending the CJEU reference by the IPT.  
 
With respect to the complaint of indiscriminate retention of data (apart from those 
aspects which were conceded to be incompatible), the Court noted that Member States 
were permitted to adopt legislation permitting decisions for the targeted retention of 
data which was sufficiently connected with the objective being pursued, strictly 
necessary, and proportionate. Part 4 of the Act did not require or permit a general or 
indiscriminate retention of data: it did not require telecommunications operators to 
retain data, but rather it gave the secretary of state the power to require it of them, but 
only where necessary and proportionate for a listed purpose laid down in s.61(7) and 
that a retention notice could not exceed 12 months. Further, s.88(1) laid down factors 
to be considered prior to issuing a retention notice and a notice had to be approved by 
a judicial commissioner under s.80; a telecommunications operator could also ask for 
review of the notice. 
 
The Court also held that the fact that the 2016 Act did not impose a seriousness 
threshold on a permissible objective for requiring data retention did not make it 
incompatible with EU law or the decisions in Watson and Tele2. In the Court’s view, 
the degree of seriousness was dealt with by applying the necessity and proportionality 
tests in the 2016 Act. 
 
Analysis 
 
The case raises a number of interesting issues with respect to the compatibility of the 
state’s investigatory powers with human rights’ law, the supremacy of EU law, and the 
constitutional and legal powers of the courts in providing redress when UK legislation 
is found to be inconsistent with EU Law. 
 
With respect to the control of such law by human rights’ norms, the European Court of 
Human Rights has always insisted that such practices are carried out with proper legal 
safeguards which restrict their use and which provide the individual with a remedy in 
cases of their illegal use (Klass v Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 214). Thus, the power to 
carry out surveillance etc. must be ‘in accordance with law’ and the domestic legislation 
must have inbuilt safeguards against abuse (Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 
14).  The passing of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 has given rise to concerns over 
the control of arbitrary use in this area, particularly in respect of the powers of bulk 
collection and data collection; and in addition to the present case and the challenge in 
Watson, these powers will be subject to challenge before the European Court of Human 
Rights (Big Brother Watch v United Kingdom (Application No. 58170/13) on the 
grounds that such collection and retention should be for limited purposes (serous 
crime) and that such data should be subject to access requests. 
 
Despite the European Court’s insistence that such activities have a clear legal basis, it 
will afford a member state a good deal of discretion when adjudicating upon the 
necessity and proportionality of such measures. Thus, in Klass, the Court accepted that 
such techniques were vital in protecting societies from sophisticated forms of espionage 
and terrorism and that states are in general justified in resorting to such methods. Thus, 
the Court’s fundamental concern is with procedural safeguards rather than challenging 
the necessity of individual measures and their application (RE v United Kingdom, 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights, 27 October 2015). The Court also 
validated UK in Kennedy v United Kingdom, The Times, 3 June 2010, where it held that 
the laws on interception were sufficiently clear and that the appeal proceedings before 
the Investigatory Appeals Tribunal maintained a fair balance between the rights of the 
applicant and national security. In contrast, in Liberty and others v United Kingdom 
(2009) 48 EHRR 1, it was held that the law had failed to set out in a form accessible to 
the public any indication of the procedure to be followed for examining, sharing, storing, 
and destroying intercepted material, and was thus in breach of Article 8 ECHR. 
 
The provisions in question in the present case revealed an incompatibility in both 
procedural and substantive terms: the lack of prior review, and the failure to limit the 
powers in connection with serious crime. These issues were concede by the government 
as being incompatible with both EU law and the ECHR, so there was little contentious 
about the present decision in terms of balancing European human rights with public 
safety. 
 
The real interest in the decision therefore is in respect of the failure of the Court to 
disapply Part 4 of the Act, and instead to merely grant a declaration that the provisions 
in question were incompatible with the rights in the EU Charter. 
 As the Court correctly pointed out, an application to disapply the Act as being 
incompatible with EU law is fundamentally different than a declaration of 
incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998. Under the Human Rights Act, 
domestic courts are not allowed to strike down or disallow primary legislation that 
cannot be reconciled with the rights laid down in the Convention. However they are 
allowed, under s.4 of the Act, to declare both primary and secondary legislation 
incompatible with the substantive rights of the European Convention. Thus, where the 
court has not been able to use its powers of interpretation under s.3 of the Act to allow 
the Act to be read as compatible with the Convention right, it may declare such 
legislation as incompatible with the relevant Convention right(s). However, unlike EU 
Law as incorporated by the European Communities Act 1972, the law of the European 
Convention and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are not regarded 
as supreme, and the 1998 Act reflects such in the powers given to the courts in the 
interpretation and application of Convention rights. Furthermore, it is a well established 
principle of EU Law that domestic courts must provide remedies that are “adequate and 
effective” (Case 14/83, Von Colson [1984] ECR 1891). This efficacy principle formed 
the basis of the ECJ’s decision in Case C-213/89, Factortame (no 2) [1990] ECR I-
2433, upon which basis the House of Lords had to create a remedy where none had 
previously existed, specifically, an injunction against the Crown from giving effect to 
an Act of Parliament. 
 
Nevertheless there is a similarity of approach in respect of the Court’s refusal in Liberty 
to use EU law to disapply the 2016 Act, and the courts’ approach in some cases under 
the Human Rights Act in determining whether or not to grant a declaration. Thus, the 
courts have refused to grant a declaration of incompatibility if to do so would pre-empt 
any legislative change. Thus, in R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] 
UKSC 63, the Supreme Court refused to grant a declaration of incompatibility with 
respect to s.3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, which disenfranchised 
convicted prisoners. The government had conceded that the ban was inconsistent with 
the right to vote, but in its consultation document it had ruled out the possibility of 
allowing post–tariff life sentence prisoners the right to vote; the specific claim made by 
the prisoner in this application. The court, thus, refused to consider granting a 
declaration until any statutory provision to comply with the European Court’s ruling 
was in place; otherwise the parliamentary process would be interfered with. In the 
Court's view, it was clear that the ban on Chester's voting rights would be maintained 
by Parliament, whatever amendments it might make in the future, and more generally, 
it was for Parliament to consider the future position of voting rights, and the instant 
court had no further role in challenging that legislation or affecting any change in the 
law. A similar reluctance is shown when courts are asked to re-interpret legislation that 
is clearly incompatible with European Convention rights, but which needs amending 
after due consideration by Parliament as to the best way to comply with the Convention 
and  
 
In the present case, the Court noted that although a provision might be absolutely 
incompatible with EU law, requiring disapplication to the extent of its inconsistency, 
such a measure would only be taken where the court was not required to set up an 
alternative scheme. In this case, as an alternative scheme of data retention and appeals 
would be required in amending the 2016 Act, the court, therefore, refused to disapply 
the Act with immediate effect, and instead issued a declaration which gave the 
government 6 months to make the necessary amendments to the law, via the 
parliamentary process. It is clear, therefore, that under both the Human Rights Act and 
EU Law, the courts can take into consideration the constitutional issues involved in 
challenging incompatible legislation. 
 
It is arguable that the decision to grant declaratory relief only could be justified on the 
basis that the direct effect and supremacy of EU Law automatically renders the Act 
invalid and unenforceable insofar as it is incompatible with EU Law. The alternative 
approach taken by the court arguably calls into question the nature of the supremacy of 
EU Law in the UK. While domestic courts in EU Member States have long taken a 
more circumspect view of the supremacy of EU Law than the CJEU (BVerfGE 73, 339 
2 BvR 197/83 (Solange II)), the decision of the Court in the instant case takes a more 
restrictive view of the supremacy and direct effect of EU Law than any decision since 
the UK’s accession to the European Communities in 1973. 
 
 
Conclusions  
The decision by Liberty to seek an order of disapplication remains a curious one. As 
the sections of the 2016 Act at issue created only vertical legal effects Liberty could 
have sought injunctive relief against the Secretary of State and the relevant public 
bodies, in a similar vain to Factortame (no 2).  
 
Furthermore, the Court’s approach to recognising the supremacy and direct effect of 
EU Law, which was designed to avoid “chaos” creates, instead, considerable ambiguity.  
